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Introduction
? Questions about the free exercise of religion have come to the fore in the 
United States recently.  Over the last few years the United States Supreme Court 
has issued a number of decisions involving the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Federal Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act.  In fact, during the 2019―2020 term the court will hear yet 
another free exercise case, Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue.1  This 
essay will provide an overview of the current state (as of 2019) of the free exercise 
of religion in the United States and suggest some important trends.
I. What is Religious Freedom?
? The term “religious freedom” and the related legal term “free exercise of 
religion” are used a lot in public discourse, and in decisions by courts in the U.S., 
but what do these terms mean?  The answer is both simple and immensely 
complex.  A comprehensive understanding of religious freedom requires years of 
study, and even then, one might find the answer to be elusive.  However, to 
understand what most people mean when they use the term “religious freedom,” 
and what most courts mean when they use the term “free exercise of religion,” the 
answer is simpler: 
Religious freedom is the freedom to follow one’s religion without inordinate 
government interference.  It is essential to understand that this is a shorthand 
definition for a complex set of ideas.  Whether government interference is inordinate 
depends on a number of legal factors.  These legal factors do not always reflect the 
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essential nature of religious freedom for people of faith, but they are all that we have 
under the law.2
II. The Free Exercise Clause and Religious Freedom Restoration Acts
? This section provides some background that will help readers understand the 
law related to religious freedom claims in the U.S. Most religious freedom claims 
seek exceptions to laws or government practices that burden religion.  Granting 
these exceptions in some cases does not mean they will be granted in all cases; 
therefore, society will not be confronted with a parade of horribles, such as human 
sacrifice, which some have argued would result from successful religious freedom 
claims.  If the law provides a basis for bringing a religious freedom claim, that 
claim is usually weighed against the interests of government and society.3 
Religious freedom claimants do not get an automatic pass to run roughshod over 
social values and government interests.  Moreover, in recent years the concept of 
discrimination against religion has been expanded in a series of cases so that it has 
also become an important religious freedom issue.4
? Religious freedom can be protected against government interference in three 
ways: first, claims under the U.S. Constitution or state constitutions; second, 
religious freedom laws; and third,  government practices that allow 
accommodation of religious freedom even when accommodation is not required 
under the law.
A. Exemption Cases
? Since 1990, the U.S. Constitution, despite having a clause protecting the free 
exercise of religion, has done little to protect religious freedom in exemption 
cases.  That year, the U.S. Supreme Court decided a case called Employment 
Division v. Smith.5  The case involved two members of the Native American 
Church in the state of Oregon who were fired and then denied unemployment 
benefits for using peyote as part of a ritual service.  Peyote and similar substances 
have been used for thousands of years in rituals by some Native American 
religions, and the members of the Native American Church involved in the Smith 
case were only allowed to chew peyote as part of a carefully supervised ritual. 
Moreover, unlike other controlled substances, there was no substantial market for 
peyote, and both the federal government and many states had exemptions to drug 
 2. Ravitch, Freedom’s Edge, 22.
 3. Ravitch, Freedom’s Edge.
 4. Trinity Lutheran v. Comer, 582 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017); Masterpiece 
Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, ___ U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
 5. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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laws for the ritual use of peyote by Native Americans.
? The case made its way to the United States Supreme Court.  A majority of the 
justices held against the members of the Native American Church.  The Supreme 
Court held that government has no duty to give an exemption to a generally 
applicable law, even if not giving the exemption substantially burdens religion. 
The court held, however, that the government may give exemptions if it chooses 
to do so.
? The Supreme Court’s ruling rejected precedent that had been in place for 
almost thirty years.  That precedent, Sherbert v. Verner,6 said that the government 
must provide exemptions to generally applicable laws (laws that apply the same to 
everyone) when those laws substantially burden religion.  This was not an 
automatic win for religious claimants, however, because the government had no 
duty to give exemptions when the government interest against providing the 
exemption was compelling (an extremely important interest) and the means the 
government used were narrowly tailored (the only practical way) to meet the 
government’s interest.  This precedent was not applied consistently before Smith, 
but it remained in place from the early 1960s until Smith was decided in 1990.
? There was a remarkable outcry against the Smith decision from politicians, 
religious groups, and civil liberties groups.  An amazing element of this outcry 
was its bipartisan and diverse nature.  The result was a new law called the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which was designed to restore the 
legal standard that applied to free exercise claims prior to Smith.7  The Federal 
RFRA was passed by a 97–3 vote in the Senate and a unanimous vote in the 
House and was signed into law by President Clinton in 1993.
? Under the RFRA, if a law or government action imposes a substantial burden 
on an individual’s or religious organization’s religion, the government must 
provide an exemption unless it has a compelling interest (extremely important 
interest) and the law or government action is the only practical way to meet that 
interest.  Given the vast bipartisan and public support for the RFRA, it is obvious 
that exemptions to generally applicable laws (laws that apply to everyone) for 
religious people were not extremely controversial when the RFRA was passed in 
1993.
? When the Supreme Court held four years later that Congress had exceeded its 
authority by imposing the RFRA on the states, numerous states passed state 
RFRAs.  Other states continued to interpret their state constitutions in a manner 
consistent with pre-Smith law.  Congress also reacted by passing the Religious 
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA),8 which applies the same 
 6. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
 7. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103―141, 107 Stat. 1488, 
42 U.S.C. ? 2000bb―4 et seq. (1993).
 8. The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub. L. 106―274, 42 U.S.C. 
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test as the RFRA to situations involving religious land use, as well as to religious 
exemption claims by prisoners.  The Supreme Court has since upheld the RLUIPA 
as applied both to the federal government and the states.9
? The general public did not view these religious freedom laws as controversial 
when they were passed.  Yet in recent years the RFRA has become a central issue 
in the culture wars in the United States, and state RFRAs are now subject to 
serious opposition.  Part of the reason is that some proposed state RFRAs 
explicitly protect for-profit entities, something the federal RFRA was not 
understood to do when it was passed.10
? Two of the major reasons that RFRAs have faced such strong opposition in 
recent years are (1) fear that they will be used to require exemptions that will 
harm third parties, and (2) fear that they will protect for-profit entities that can use 
RFRAs to impose the owners’ religious values on employees and customers. 
Prior to 2014, it seemed that neither of these scenarios was particularly likely (and 
as will be seen, even today it is less likely than most people think because of 
compelling government interests in many of these situations).  In 2014, however, 
the United States Supreme Court decided Burwell v. Hobby Lobby.11  The court for 
the first time held that for-profit entities are protected under the RFRA, even when 
doing so could, as a practical matter, place a burden on third parties.  It is 
important to note that the majority of the Supreme Court held that there was no 
actual burden on third parties in that case, a holding that is highly questionable 
given the facts in that case.12
? Yet, the specter of for-profit entities discriminating against members of the 
LGBTQ community or refusing to insure female employees’ reproductive rights 
has become a rallying cry against RFRAs and religious freedom more generally. 
This is unfortunate because most religious exemption claims do not have any 
impact on third parties and primarily inure to the benefit of religious minorities.13 
Section III will further address the perceived tension between religious 
exemptions under the RFRA and the rights of third parties.
B. Discrimination Cases
? Although in many ways the decision in Smith vastly limited the power of the 
Federal Free Exercise Clause, the clause has had a renaissance of sorts, but not 
? 2000cc et seq. (2000).
 9. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
 10. Ravitch, Freedom’s Edge.
 11. 573 U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
 12. Douglas Nejaime and Reva B. Siegel, “Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience 
Claims in Religion and Politics,” 124 Yale Law Journal 2516 (2015).
 13. Ravitch, Freedom’s Edge.
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one that will help those who need religious exemptions.  This renaissance has 
focused on the principle that government must remain neutral toward religious 
individuals and entities when it creates or enforces law.  A violation of this 
“neutrality” principle can result in unconstitutional discrimination.  If a law is not 
neutral and generally applicable the government must meet a strict scrutiny test.14 
In these cases the rule from Employment Division v. Smith does not apply.15
? This principle arose most clearly in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of 
Hialeah16. In that case the court found the actions of the City of Hialeah were 
neither generally applicable nor neutral when the city passed an ordinance that 
targeted the Santeria practice of animal sacrifice.  The ordinance, while neutral on 
its face, only applied to Santeria practices and thus failed the neutrality 
requirement.  The city did not allege an adequate compelling interest, and the 
ordinance was far from the least restrictive means of meeting the alleged 
compelling interest.
? Justice Scalia, the author of the Smith decision, filed an opinion concurring in 
part in the judgment.  Interestingly, Justice Scalia’s opinion took issue with the 
court’s imposition of the neutrality requirement, which he viewed as unnecessarily 
repetitive of the general applicability test from Smith.17  The majority answered 
that neutrality is important because laws may be generally applicable on their 
face, yet still target religion in their structure or application.18  Until recently, it 
seemed that this limit on the Smith principle could only arise in cases where there 
is some sort of intentional discrimination or religious gerrymandering aimed at a 
religious practice.
? Then, in Trinity Lutheran v. Comer,19 the court applied the neutrality concept to 
a situation where the law was not designed to harm the practice of religion, but 
rather denied religious entities access to a state benefit?playground chips 
recycled from tires under a state program?due to a clause in the state 
constitution.  The court held that this sort of denial, which was based on religion, 
discriminates in violation of the neutrality principle and is therefore 
unconstitutional.  In Trinity Lutheran, the neutrality principle went from protecting 
against religious discrimination that targets religious practices to creating a 
seemingly broad-based ban on differential treatment of religion even when the 
differential treatment is based on state establishment of religious concerns.20
?  More recently, in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights 
 14. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993).
 15. Id.
 16. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
 17. Id. at 557 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
 18. Id. at 533–34.
 19. 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017).
 20. Id. 2039―41 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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Commission,21 the court expanded the neutrality principle further.  In Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, Jack Phillips, the owner of a bakery in Lakewood, Colorado, refused to 
make a wedding cake for Charlie Craig and David Mullins’s wedding reception. 
Phillips is a devout Christian and opposes same-sex marriage.  He had no 
problem, however, providing sales or services to gays and lesbians in contexts 
other than weddings.
? The Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA) clearly protects gays and 
lesbians from discrimination in public accommodations.22  Craig and Mullins filed 
a complaint under the CADA.  The Colorado Civil Rights Division investigated 
the complaint and found probable cause, and sent the matter to the Colorado Civil 
Rights Commission.  Craig and Mullins won their case before an administrative 
law judge and on appeal to the commission from the administrative law judge’s 
decision.  Ultimately, the Colorado Court of Appeals upheld the commission’s 
decision and ordered Phillips to cease and desist in his refusal to make wedding 
cakes for same-sex marriages.  The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari23 after 
the Colorado Supreme Court refused to hear the case.
? Phillips raised two constitutional defenses to the violation of Colorado law. 
First, he claimed that his religious convictions should protect him from making 
the cake for the wedding reception since doing so would make him complicit in 
what he views as a sin.  He also claimed that making a wedding cake is a use of 
his artistic and creative talent.  Therefore, forcing him to make the cake would be 
a violation of his free speech rights.
? Colorado does not have a Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) so at 
first glance it seemed the state did not need to show a compelling interest and 
narrow tailoring for refusing to give Phillips an exemption from the generally 
applicable civil rights law.24  It seemed, at least to many observers, that the main 
argument upon which Phillips would have a chance was the free speech 
argument.25  As it turns out, however, the court punted and did not answer either 
question directly due to some extenuating facts the court found central to the 
outcome.26  As a result, commentators have lamented the lack of guidance that 
states and lower courts have in deciding cases involving conflicts between 
complicity and discrimination, at least in situations where there is no RFRA and 
 21. ___ U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
 22. Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act, Colo. Rev. Stat. ?24―34―601(2)(a)(2017).
 23. This refers to a writ or order by which a higher court that has discretion to hear an 
appeal, in this situation the U.S. Supreme Court, reviews a case decided by a lower court.
 24. See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that government does 
not have a duty to provide exemptions to laws of general applicability under the Free Exercise 
Clause).
 25. Frank S. Ravitch and Brett G. Scharffs, “Point-Counterpoint, Piece of Cake: 
Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission,” 102 Judicature 67 (2018).
 26. ____ U.S. ____, 138 S. Ct. at 1729―32.
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expressive activity is involved.27  As I have explained elsewhere, even with a 
RFRA, there would be no guarantee that Phillips would have won on the merits, 
although it would have been a much closer question.28
? The court did not decide the free speech issues in the case because it found a 
pattern of hostility against religion by the Colorado Civil Rights Commission,29 
and because Jack Phillips was treated differently by the commission than bakers 
who refused to make cakes containing homophobic messages that referenced 
religion.  If either of these findings were based on solid facts, Masterpiece 
Cakeshop would indeed be a case similar to Lukumi Babalu Aye, or at the very 
least, Trinity Lutheran.
? Significantly, the argument that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission (rather 
than one commissioner in one hearing) demonstrated hostility toward religion is 
highly questionable.  Certainly, any hostility was far from that aimed at Santeria 
in Lukumi Babalu Aye.30  Moreover, the comparison to the cases involving other 
bakers was based on creating a false equivalency between apples and oranges.31 
In fact, two concurring justices recognized that these situations could have been 
treated differently.  They disagreed, however, with the commission’s decisions 
because the commission relied on its perception of the offensiveness of the denials 
in the two situations rather than the actual differences between the two situations.32
? Masterpiece Cakeshop expands the sort of conduct that can lead to a finding of 
discrimination in violation of the Free Exercise Clause.  In this way, whether one 
likes the outcome or not, it is a big step away from the Smith standard and a 
significant addition to the trend of expanding the neutrality principle from Lukumi 
Babalu Aye.  It might also work against free exercise claims under facts different 
from those in Masterpiece Cakeshop, and it could perhaps be used against states 
that favor particular religions.
? One question left open by the expansion of what counts as discrimination 
 27. Kevin Drum, “The Cake Ruling Wasn’t ‘Narrow,’ It Was a Punt,” Mother Jones, June 5, 
2018; Christine Emba, “The Supreme Court Wasn’t Ready to Decide on the Wedding Cake. 
Neither are We,” Washington Post, June 5, 2018; Garrett Epps, “Justice Kennedy’s Masterpiece 
Ruling: The Supreme Court Found in Favor of a Baker who Refused to Sell a Cake to a Same-
sex Couple, but Used a Rationale that Sheds Little Light on the Case’s Larger Civil-Rights 
Implications,” The Atlantic, June 4, 2018; Timothy R. Holbrook, “Analysis: Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission,” Emory Law News Center, June 20, 
2018, http://law.emory.edu/news-center/releases/2018/06/masterpiece-cake-shop-opinion-
holbrook.html.
 28. Ravitch, Freedom’s Edge.
 29. ___ U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. at 1729―30.
 30. See generally, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (recounting a detailed pattern of religious animus 
and the gerrymandering of ordinances to target a particular religious practice).
 31. Id. at 1750―51 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
 32. Id. at 1732―33 (Kagan, J., concurring).
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under the Free Exercise Clause in Trinity Lutheran and Masterpiece Cakeshop is 
whether states can be forced to include religious entities in school funding or tax 
credit programs when doing so would violate state constitutional prohibitions on 
funding religious education.  The court may answer this question in the 2019–
2020 term in a case from Montana that involves tax credits that were likely to 
inure primarily to the benefit of religious schools and their students.33  The 
Montana Supreme Court held that the tax credit program violates the Montana 
state constitution’s prohibition on direct or indirect government funding for 
religious education.  The case is now before the U.S. Supreme Court and the 
petitioners are arguing that Trinity Lutheran should be applied and therefore the 
Montana Supreme Court’s decision violates the Federal Free Exercise Clause.  We 
may have an answer by June 2020.
III. Current Trends and Issues
? There are a large number of important issues about the free exercise of religion 
in the United States, but two will be of central focus in the coming years.  The 
first is the extent to which states must include religious entities in general funding 
programs that benefit similar private entities.  As explained in the previous 
section, that issue will possibly be addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 
near future.
? The second issue involves the interaction between free exercise claims and the 
rights of third parties.  These situations often involve complicity claims. 
Complicity has been defined in a number of ways by a variety of scholars both 
from the legal academy and from the fields of religion and philosophy.34  The 
general thrust of the concept in the religion context is that by doing something, or 
by failing to do something, a person or entity becomes complicit in the harm or 
sin that results.  The most obvious example of a complicity claim is when a 
Catholic hospital refuses to allow abortions to be performed on its premises.  The 
church argues that by allowing its facilities to be used for abortions it becomes 
complicit in what it views as the sin that results.  One need not agree with the 
church’s position on abortion to understand the basic argument.
? These claims differ from other sorts of free exercise claims because as Douglas 
Nejaime and Reva Siegel have explained, they are not about what one does or 
does not do directly, but rather about how what one does or does not do facilitates 
 33. Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue (DA 17―0492), docketed March 14, 2019.
 34. John Corvino, Ryan T. Anderson, and Sherif Girgis, Debating Religious Liberty and 
Freedom (Oxford University Press, 2017); Douglas Laycock, “Religious Liberty for Politically 
Active Minority Groups: A Response to Nejaime and Siegel,” 125 Yale Law Journal Forum, 
369 (2016); Nejaime and Siegel, “Conscience Wars.”
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some more indirect harm.35  Moreover, complicity claims are more likely to?but 
do not necessarily?involve the rights of others.  As Douglas Laycock has 
explained, however, the fact that the harm to a person or entity seeking protection 
from becoming complicit is connected to the acts or rights of third parties makes 
little or no difference from a religious perspective.36
? For example, forcing a Quaker who opposes war to make weapons that will be 
used by others to kill in war remains a significant harm even if he or she is not 
forced to directly engage in war.37  While manufacturing weapons may be less 
direct than fighting, the end result is that the person has violated his or her faith by 
facilitating killing in war.  One can choose not to empathize with this person’s 
belief or one can choose not to regard it as worthy of legal protection, but that 
does not make it any less a harm for the person involved.
? These sorts of claims are increasingly arising in cases where for-profit entities 
seek to deny services to members of the LGBTQ community.  The most common 
context for this is where the denial relates to same-sex marriages.  Masterpiece 
Cakeshop is one such case, but there are many others and the number of these 
sorts of cases is likely to increase.  I have argued there are ways to accommodate 
both religious freedom and sexual freedom in most of these situations, but for-
profit entities raise special problems.38  I hope that it will be possible to protect 
both robust religious freedom and LGBTQ rights in these situations, but how this 
can be done and how the U.S. Supreme Court will address this issue when the 
next case comes before it remain open questions.
Conclusion
? The free exercise of religion in the United States is a complex issue and one 
that has both constitutional and statutory components.  The issues moving forward 
will involve balancing free exercise rights against the rights of third parties, 
especially when for-profit entities assert complicity concerns, and the limits on the 
United States Supreme Court’s current expansion of the neutrality-discrimination 
concept.  Free exercise of religion in the United States will remain a fascinating 
topic for years to come.
 35. Nejaime and Siegel, “Conscience Wars.”
 36. Laycock, “Religious Liberty.”
 37. See, for example, Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security 
Division, 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (involving a Jehovah’s Witness in this exact situation).
 38. Ravitch, Freedom’s Edge; Ravitch, “Complicity and Discrimination.”
